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The complexion of societies and civilizations change, often with amazing
rapidity. A nation once primarily rural in character becomes predomi-
nantly urban. Representative schemes once fair and equitable become
archaic and dated. (Chief Justice Warren, in Reynolds v. Sims.)
HE SUPREME COURT’S full acceptance, in the Reynolds case, of the doc-
trine of &dquo;one man, one vote&dquo; will, if implemented, unquestionably result in
JL major shifts in the balance of power in state legislatures. The precise nature
of these shifts is as yet unclear, and depends in part on subsequent judicial construc-
tion of the court’s somewhat cryptic comments regarding permissible deviations from
the equal population standards in order to achieve the objective of &dquo;insuring some
voice to political subdivisions, as political subdivisions.&dquo; 1 The shifts would also be
negated should legislation be enacted or a constitutional amendment be ratified
which would remove the matter of legislative apportionment from the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
The immediate popular analysis of the decision, however, stressed a major
political victory of urban majorities over entrenched rural minorities. Some of the
remarks of the Chief Justice, including the words quoted above, indicate that the
court shared this belief to some extent.2 In order to understand whether this is an
accurate assessment of the probable effects of the decision, we must first be able to
measure effectively the incidence of over-and-under-representation in any given
state. The courts, including state and lower federal courts, have significantly lacked
any precise measuring device which might have accomplished this purpose. In
plunging boldly into the mathematical quagmire, the court placed major reliance
on two measuring devices: the range in population size between largest and smallest
districts,3 and the &dquo;majority to elect&dquo; (Dauer-Kelsey scale) .4 Neither of these devices
1 12 L. Ed.2nd 506.
2 In a footnote following the quoted remarks, Warren qualifies them by saying: "Although
legislative apportionment controversies are generally viewed as involving urban-rural
conflicts, much evidence indicates presently it is the fast-growing suburban areas which
are the most seriously underrepresented in many of our state legislatures. And, while cur-
rently the thrust of state legislative malapportionment results, in most States, in under-
representation of urban and suburban areas, in earlier times cities were in fact overrepre-
sented in a number of States...." Ibid., at 530, n. 42.
3 Cf. National Municipal League, Compendium on Legislative Apportionment (2nd ed.; Wash-
ington, 1962), passim. The summary table (pp. iii-iv) in this publication gives two items
of information for each state, in addition to the average size of districts: one is the Dauer-
Kelsey scale, and the other is the range of population size. Range has apparently been
almost universally cited by plaintiffs in suits attacking apportionments. Most apportion-
ment opinions have referred to the range existing in the litigated apportionment, but there
is nothing approaching unanimity among judicial attitudes toward this measurement,
though a majority of the opinions seem to regard it as one piece of evidence to be con-
sidered, and a few apparently regard a wide range as conclusive evidence of unconstitu-
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can, or was intended to, measure the representation of rural and urban populations
as such. Of course, if district population size alone is to be considered, such meas-
ures may be adequate (leaving aside questions of statistical appropriateness), but
they can tell us nothing about probable shifts of political power between urban and
rural populations. Nor can they help us evaluate the decision of the court in terms
of the &dquo;gravity of the evil&dquo; of rural overrepresentation, which quite obviously was
at least one consideration in the minds of the majority justices.
The purpose of this article is to describe a technique for measuring the repre-
sentation of the rural and urban populations as such in all of the ninety-nine state
legislative bodies. The technique used is an application of the David-Eisenberg
indices,5 which measure &dquo;the value of the right to vote&dquo; in each of the counties of the
United States, and for both houses of bicameral bodies. David and Eisenberg divided
the average population of all districts in the body under study by the population of
each legislative district, and multiplied the result by 100. Thus, if all districts were of
tionality. Dicta in Scholle v. Hare, 376 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 Michigan Supreme
Court (1962), is to the effect that "When a legislative apportionment provides districts
having more than double the population of others, the constitutional range of discretion
is violated." (Opinion of Kavanagh, J.) Similarly, in Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885
(1962), Oklahoma, the court appended to its opinion the testimony of Dr. Joseph Pray,
a political scientist, who stated: "... to the extent you have one to 26, you have a diffusion
of suffrage power which is as bad as if the vote was not counted because of fraud...."
On the other hand, Judge O. Bowie Duckett, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, Maryland, in the case of Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes,
opinion reproduced by photo offset in Court Decisions on Legislative Apportionment
(New York, National Municipal League, 1962), 3 volumes, rather pointedly rejected the
argument that the Maryland range was much worse (33 to 1) than that found repugnant
in Michigan (12 to 1). Judge Duckett included this plea in a discussion of "points of
little merit." The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Judge Duckett’s decision, 182 A.2d
877 (1962). Other cases in which range has been utilized in one way or another include:
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (1962), Georgia; Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158
(1962), Georgia; WMCA v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741 (1962), New York; Sims v. Frink,
208 F. Supp. 431, Alabama; Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (1962), Florida; Wiscon-
sin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (1962), Wisconsin; Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d
241 (1962), Idaho; Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 817 (1962) Vermont; Lisco v. Mc-
Nichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (1962), Colorado; and Stein v. General Assembly, 374 P.2d
77 (1962), Colorado.
Similar use was made of the range in the Reynolds case, and in the accompanying
cases decided on the same day.
A good discussion of the problems connected with the use of the range may be found
in W. Allen Wallis and Harry V. Roberts, Statistics: A New Approach (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1956), pp. 245-47. Wallis and Roberts charge that the Kinsey report came to some
of its more interesting findings as a result of misusing the range.
Some of the rough evaluation systems proposed and actually used by courts seem
to involve a failure to appreciate that overrepresentation should always be judged by look-
ing at the other side of the coin: the effect of the overrepresentation on those underrepre-
sented. We feel that the range is of dubious value, both statistically and historically. Al-
most any elementary statistics textbook warns against the misuse of the range as a meas-
ure of dispersion.
4 Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsey, "Unrepresentative States," National Municipal Re-
view (December 1955), pp. 571-5, 587, as corrected in National Municipal Review (April
1956), p. 198.
5 Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote (Char-
lottesville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, Vol. 1, 1961; Vol.
11, 1962). For a discussion of the David-Eisenberg indices, as well as a proposal for a
statistically sophisticated method of evaluating state legislative apportionment (with dis-
trict population equality as the basic sandard), see Glendon Schubert and Charles Press,
"Measuring Malapportionment," American Political Science Review, 58 (June 1964),
302-27.
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equal population, each district (and every county) would have an index number of
100. A district which has twice the average population would have an index of 50,
signifying that each vote in the district has a weight of only 50 per cent of the state
average, while a district with only half the average population would have an index
number of 200, indicating that the value of the vote in such a district is twice as great
as the state average. Since all the counties in a given legislative district necessarily
have the same index number, it was possible to assign indices to every county in the
United States.
Our technique for measuring rural and urban representation involves the
weighting of the rural population, as reported in the 1960 census, by the David-
Eisenberg indices. For each county, we have multiplied the actual rural population
by the David-Eisenberg index for that county. We have thus computed a weighted,
rural population for each state, the weighting being supplied, in effect, by the appor-
tionment system in use in the state in 1960. Dividing the weighted rural population,
for each state legislative chamber, by the state’s actual rural population gives us the
index of rural representation in that body. We,_ determined the urban index by sub-
tracting the weighted rural population for each chamber from the actual total popu-
lation, arriving at a weighted urban population, and then dividing by the actual
urban population.
Ninety-seven of the ninety-nine state legislative bodies, as of 1960, were so
apportioned as to give an advantage to the rural population. The only two excep-
tions are found in Massachusetts, where both houses slightly overrepresent the urban
population.
Although Anglo-Saxon tradition has it that the upper house should be repre-
sentative of special interests, there are twenty-one lower houses in which the rural
population is more heavily weighted than in the corresponding upper house. Since
there is no consistent pattern as between upper and lower houses, we have tabulated
the data into two categories: those houses, whether upper or lower, which more
closely approach straight popular representation (Table I ) , and those houses which
are less popular (Table II).
What is the value of the data presented in tables I and II? In attempting to
evaluate a state apportionment system as to the extent of rural overrepresentation,6 6
one might conceivably set some upper limit on the degree to which the rural popula-
tion can be favored. But overrepresentation of any group is presumably offensive
from a constitutional point of view only if it has a serious adverse effect on the rights
and interests of other individuals or groups. Of course, any overrepresentation, of
whatever degree, necessarily involves underrepresentation. Someone must pay the
piper. But any conceivable system of apportionment will grant some advantage to
certain individuals or groups. The scholar or the judge who wishes to evaluate a
given apportionment system must evaluate the adverse effect of any overrepresenta-
6 We wish to emphasize that we are using the terms "overrepresentation" and underrepresenta-
tion" in a purely descriptive statistical sense. It is not our intention in this article either
to support or oppose the doctrine that population should be the sole standard for evaluat-
ing apportionment systems. We assume only that almost all contending parties, in the
current national controversy regarding apportionment, will agree that it is a factor of




tion that may be identified. On the principle de minimus, we are not likely to worry
if we find that some small group of individuals, such as fertilizer salesmen or circus
ringmasters, is greatly overrepresented as a result of the fortuities of their places of
residence and the peculiarities of the apportionment system.
What is needed, then, is a method of evaluating the effects of rural overrepre-
sentation on urban dwellers.7 We have developed an application of the basic data
presented in tables I and II which we believe will make this possible. The first step
is to ascertain the effect of the apportionment system in a given state on the popula-
tion balance between urban and rural in each state. To do this, we can weight the
rural percentage of the population by the indices given in the two tables. If a given
state has a population which is 50 per cent rural, and the rural population is weighted
at 110 and 120 respectively in the two houses of the legislature, the weighted rural
population percentages would be 55 and 60, respectively. These weighted rural per-
centages are given in Table III. A comparison of Table III with the preceding two
illustrates the danger of overreliance on any measure of the overrepresentation of a
given group or area. The greatest overrepresentation of the rural population does
not necessarily produce the greatest underrepresentation of urban dwellers. The
larger the urban population, the more painlessly it may absorb rural overrepresenta-
tion. But when the shoe is on the other foot, and urban dwellers are in the minority
or in a small majority, even apparently moderate overrepresentation of the rural
population may dilute the urban vote quite seriously.
The statistics on weighted rural percentages of the population invite their classi-
fication into four categories directly related in the distribution of political power
within a state:
1. States in which an Existing Rural Majority Was Strengthened
There were eleven states in which there was a rural majority. In all of these,
the 1960 rural majority was overrepresented in both houses of the legislature, usually
in a serious fashion. This in itself is an interesting commentary on the widely believed
notion that rural overrepresentation is largely a device to protect an embattled rural
minority from the hordes of the great cities. But in Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and West Virginia, an urban minority, far from getting special protection
for its interests, found its limited political power further eroded by favoritism toward
a more numerous rural population.
2. States in which an Artificial Rural Ma jority Was Created in Both Houses of the
Legislature
There were thirteen states, over a fourth of the total, in which an urban ma-
jority was transmuted into a rural majority in both houses by the apportionment sys-
tem. (This includes Nebraska’s unicameral legislature. ) In addition to Nebraska,
the states in this category were Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia. In most of these
states, the transformation was startling in its thoroughness. A 30 per cent rural
7 David and Eisenberg, op. c t.
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minority in Nevada became 50 per cent in one house and 73 per cent in the other,
and a strong rural minority in Virginia (44 per cent) became an overwhelming ma-
jority in both houses (65 and 70 per cent, respectively). Maine is an exception to
this, however. There a very small urban majority was pushed over the line into
minority status in both houses, but the change was only from an actual 49 per cent
to 52 and 54 per cent, respectively.
3. States in which an Artificial Rural Majority was Created in One House Only
There were six states in this group: Arizona, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Mexico, and Wyoming. In all except Arizona, the rural minority was sub-
stantially overrepresented in both houses, but there was still a weighted urban ma-
jority in one house. The relative smallness of the group is evidence that most appor-
tionment systems do not have as widely divergent effects on rural population in the
two houses of bicameral system as is often supposed. In fact, there were only four
states in the Union (Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio) in which the
weighted rural population in one house was as much as 10 percentage points greater
than in the other.
4. States in which an Urban Majority Was Retained in Both Houses
Of the thirty-nine urban states, twenty retain an urban majority in both houses.
This group includes all states not classified in Groups 1-3. In all of these states except
Massachusetts, the urban majority was attenuated by the apportionment system. It
is significant, however, that all of the largest states are in this group. The most popu-
lous states tend to be the most urbanized, and as noted earlier, are more able to
absorb rural overrepresentation without disastrous dilution of the urban majority.
California is the best example. In the California Senate, the rural population enjoys
the greatest overrepresentation in the United States, with an index of 286. Yet be-
cause California is less than 14 per cent rural, the weighted rural population for the
California Senate is only 39 per cent of the total. A similar situation exists in New
Jersey, with its constitutional requirement of one senator per county, resulting in a
rural index of 241. New Jersey is the most heavily urban state in the nation, and the
weighted rural population for the Senate is only 27 per cent.
Of the eight states which are at least 75 per cent urban, all fall into Group 4,
still further evidence that the most severe apportionment discriminations are not
against the big urban majorities, but against urban minorities and small majorities.
A TWO-DIMENSIONAL SCHEME FOR EVALUATING URBAN REPRESENTATION
While the above classification is, we believe, useful for illustrating shifts in the
distribution of urban and rural political power as a result of apportionment provi-
sions and action or inaction, and is therefore pertinent evidence to be considered
in evaluating a state apportionment, it is perhaps necessary to apply some other
standard than that of the shifting majority. As noted above, there are instances -
e.g., Maine - where a transformation in majorities has taken place despite relatively
moderate rural overrepresentation, and other states where no such shift has occurred
despite very large differences between real and weighted rural percentages.
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Devising a measurable single standard for evaluating apportionments is most
difficult. A major problem in the creation of such a standard is inherent in the
bicameral system. How is it possible to summarize, say in a single index number,
the effect of two different apportionment systems applying to the two houses of a
given legislature? Some use has been made of the technique of averaging index num-
bers for the two houses. David and Eisenberg have computed such an average for all
counties and districts.8 Alan L. Clem has utilized a bicameral average in evaluating
the apportionment of five mid-western states.9 We have preferred to avoid the
utilization of averages. The average will operate to conceal significant differences
between the two houses, and will make quite dissimilar apportionments appear to be
identical in their effect. Thus, if we have one legislature in which the rural popula-
tion has a weight of 75 in one house and 125 in another, the average would be 100.
In evaluating the constitutionality or the political wisdom of a given overrepre-
sentation of rural population, we would suggest, on the basis of our previous analysis,
that major emphasis must be placed on the measurement of the effect on the urban
population rather than on the isolated calculation of a ratio of overrepresentation of
the rural population alone. We would further suggest that the evaluation must com-
prehend the entire apportionment, rather than isolated extreme cases.
If we are to understand the degree of urban underrepresentation in the forty-
nine bicameral systems on the eve of the Baker and Reynolds decisions, it is neces-
sary somehow to retain in a single measure the integrity of the individual measure-
ments of both houses of each bicameral legislature. Following Baker and before
Reynolds, there seemed to be ample grounds for the prediction made by Solicitor
General Archibald Cox in his widely quoted address to the Tennessee Bar Associa-
tion in June 1962:
I do not mean to suggest how the question should be decided, but it would not surprise me
greatly if the court were to hold that if seats in one branch of the legislature are apportioned in
direct ratio to population, the allocation of seats in the upper branch may recognize historical,
political and geographic subdivisions provided that the departure from equal representation in
proportion to the population is not too extreme. But surely a very strong argument can also be
made that there must be representation proportionate to the population in at least one branch
of the legislature.’
The court’s sweeping rejection of the federal analogy, and indeed of every
standard save equal populations in both houses of every legislature, made it unneces-
sary for the courts to develop any ground rules for the application of the Cox for-
mula. Had it been adopted by the court, subsequent litigation might have revealed
the extent to which state apportionment systems represented population strictly in
one house, while producing moderate but substantial deviations from the popula-
tion standard in the other house. Despite, or perhaps because of, the court’s adop-
8 Ibid.
9 Alan L. Clem, "Legislative Malapportionment and the Mathematical Quagmire," paper read
at annual meeting of Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, April 27, 1962 (mimeo-
graphed).
10 Quoted, with emphasis indicated, in Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes
(Supplemental Opinion), loc. cit. Subsequently, in his amicus brief in the Reynolds case,
the Solicitor General argued for the standard set forth in his earlier speech. See Justice
Stewart’s dissent in WMCA v. Lomenzo. 12 L. Ed.2d 568, n. 16 at 591.
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tion of a single standard for both houses, it remains important to make such an
inquiry, both from the point of view of evaluating the action of the court, and in
order to assess the probability of urban-rural shifts in political power which may
arise as a result of the Reynolds decision.
If we define a &dquo;population&dquo; house as one in which the urban population has
not less than 90 per cent of its full population entitlement, and if we further assume
that the moderate but substantial deviation suggested by Cox for the other house
would produce an urban representation of not less than 75 per cent, we can then
evaluate the apportionment system of each state as it existed prior to the Baker and
Reynolds decisions. To be sure, the 90-75 standard is arbitrary, and can be no more
than a rule of thumb. In any event, the determination of specific allowable percent-
ages is not crucial to our technique of measurement. Utilizing the data presented
below, the reader may apply whatever standards seem appropriate to him.
In presenting our data, we have found it helpful to utilize a graphic presenta-
tion of the pertinent data (See Figure 1). Since it is necessary to combine two meas-
ures into one, we have plotted on the vertical axis the index of urban representation
in the more popular house, i.e., in the house with the lesser overrepresentation of
rural population, disregarding whether this happens to be the upper or lower house.
On the horizontal axis we have plotted the index of urban representation in the less
popular house. We are thus able to plot each state at a single point on the graph. We
FIGURE 1
TWO DIMENSIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF URBAN REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES
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can also indicate our chosen limits of deviation by drawing a line across the graph at
the index of 90 for the more popular house (which is plotted on the vertical axis),
and another line from the top to the bottom of the graph at the index of 75 for the
less popular house (plotted on the horizontal axis). We thus divide our graph into
four rather unequal quadrants. In the process, we also group the states into four
categories, based on their respective positions on the graph.
In the upper right-hand quadrant, we find twenty states which meet the 90-75
standard. That is, in all of these states, the urban population is weighted at not less 
.
than 90 per cent of actual in one house, and at not less than 75 per cent of actual in
the other.
In the upper left-hand quadrant there are only three states: Arizona, California,
and Missouri. These are the states which have one house which meets the standard
of strict popular representation, but in which the other house exceeds the allowable
dilution of the urban vote. It should be noted that California misses the acceptable
category only slightly.
In the lower right-hand quadrant, we have a group of eleven states, in which
neither house meets the standard of 90 per cent, but in which the less popular house
is within the 75 per cent limit.&dquo; In these states, the remedy needed would be to re-
apportion one house along strict population lines.
Finally, in the lower left-hand quadrant, we come to the rejects: the sixteen
states in which both houses fail to meet our standards. Most of them are not even
close to compliance in either house.
In addition to the graphic presentation, we have tabulated these four groups
in Table IV, together with supplementary information about each state.
An analysis of the graphical presentation in Figure 1, and the accompanying
information in Table IV, reveals some significant facts. Sixteen of the twenty states
in Group 1, the acceptable category according to the 90-75 standard, have urban
majorities. In only one state, Maine, is a rural minority converted to a legislative
majority through the apportionment system. The Maine case can largely be dis-
counted because of the thin margin of the actual urban majority (51.29 per cent
urban), and the moderate degree of rural overrepresentation (103.8 per cent in the
more popular house and 111.1 per cent in the less popular house). Also, Group 1
includes all of the large industrial states which are usually considered &dquo;pivotal&dquo; in
a presidential election, with the exceptions of California and Texas which are not
far away from the group. 112
At the other extreme, Group 4 is composed of five rural states, nine urban states
in which the apportionment system creates an artificial rural majority in both houses
of the legislature, and two urban states in which an artificial rural majority is formed
in one legislative house. In only three of those urban states, Florida, Maryland, and
11 Nebraska’s unicameral system is included in this group.
12 The "pivotal" states include, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and California. In California, the less popular house falls only 4.3
points short of meeting the standard of 75 per cent representation for the urban popula-
tion. The more popular house is well over the 90 per cent minimum. In Texas, the less
popular house is well over 75 in its urban index while the more popular falls 1.1 points
short of the required 90.
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Nevada, does the urban population exceed 70 per cent of the total. In each of those
heavily urban states, the apportionment systems massively overrepresent the rural
populace in order to produce the rural majorities in the legislatures involved. 13 In
the other states, the degree of rural overrepresentation is considerably less.
This analysis clearly illustrates the point suggested earlier: that the overrepre-
sentation of the rural population is a far more serious problem in those states having
a small urban majority or an urban minority. In such instances, even a moderate
amount of rural overrepresentation can have serious effect on the representation of
the urban population. Conversely, a state having a large urban population can tol-
erate a substantial degree of rural overrepresentation without serious consequences.
TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION OF STATES BASED UPON 90-75 RULE OF URBAN REPRESENTATION
13 The indices of rural representation are 194.0 and 199.4 in Florida, 156.9 and 204.0 in Mary-
land, and 169.6 and 245.8 in Nevada. 
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TABLE IV (CONTINUED)
CLASSIFICATION OF STATES BASED UPON 90-75 RULE OF URBAN REPRESENTATION
The point is further strengthened by the graphical representation of the 90-75
standard in Figure 2. The urban percentage of the population of a state is plotted
on the vertical axis. The index of rural representation which can be permitted in a
legislative body given a certain index of urban representation is plotted on the hori-
zontal axis. The two curves represent the standard of an urban index of 90 in the
more popular house and 75 in the less popular house. 14 Thus a state with an urban
14 The two curves are derived from the mathematical relationship which exists between the
urban and rural population of a state and from the indices of rural and urban representa-
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percentage of, say, 75, such as Texas or Utah, could permit a rural index of 130 in
the more popular house and 180 in the less popular. On the other hand, a state
which is 50 per cent urban, such as Montana, can permit rural indices of only 110
and 125 in its more and less popular houses if it is to comply with the 90-75 standard.
FIGURE 2
PERMISSIBLE DEGREE OF RURAL OVER-REPRESENTATION UNDER A 90-75 STANDARD
OF URBAN REPRESENTATION
The 90 and 75 curves slope sharply upward as the urban percentage rises to a critical
point (somewhere between 65 and 75 per cent urban) where relatively heavy rural
overrepresentation can be tolerated. But below this point, ostensibly mild rural
overrepresentation has an unacceptable effect on the representation of the urban
population. 15
tion in a state legislative body. This relationship is equal to the urban percentage of the
population divided by the rural percentage. The same relationship exists between the
degree of rural overrepresentation and urban underrepresentation. Thus:
The rural indices permissible with an urban index of 90 (the standard for the more popu-
lar house) are obtained from the formula:
Similarly, with an urban index of 75 (the standard for the less popular house) ;
15 An infinite number of such curves can be drawn, depending upon the standards selected. It is
possible to plot curves for an 85-70, a 90-60, or any other given standard.
In similar fashion, it is possible to evaluate the effects of an apportionment system
upon any element of a state’s population which can be identified and counted. The group
may be geographic, occupational, racial, religious, political, or of any other identifiable
characteristic. The indices of the group’s representation in the state legislature can be
calculated by applying the David-Eisenberg indices to the group membership in each
county, a weighted vote for the group in each house of the legislature determined, and
compared with the group’s actual membership. The analysis can then be continued along
lines we have followed here. It would thus be possible to determine, for example, the
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Referring to Figure 1, we note that there are sixteen states, excluding Nebraska,
which have approximately the same degree of urban representation in both houses
of their legislatures.16 The fact that these states are so widely dispersed on the graph
indicates that there is no significant relationship between similar indices of repre-
sentation of the urban population in the two legislative bodies and the acceptability
of the apportionment system in terms of the 90-75 standard. It also indicates that,
within the context of rural versus urban representation, the supposedly traditional
practice of having one popular house and one house in which representation is based
upon other factors is often ignored with varying effects upon the urban population.
Much of the current apportionment controversy focuses upon the type of sys-
tem used. Although it is difficult to classify apportionment systems precisely because
of the many variations in use, the six basic categories noted by Malcolm E. Jewell
seem reasonable and comprehensive. 17 Table V shows the number of houses appor-
tioned under each system and the range of urban indices in each category. These
data substantiate the normal expectation that while apportionment systems nomi-
nally based upon population achieve their presumed goals most imperfectly and un-
evenly, they do approach straight popular representation more closely than those
systems which combine population and area. The combination systems, however,
have generally less serious effects upon the urban populace than systems which pro-
vide equal apportionment for each unit or in which apportionment is fixed in the
state constitution. The taxation system is not widely enough used to permit any
evaluation.
As a check of the validity of our ranking of the states according to the repre-
sentation of the urban population, we considered the possibility that our utilization
TABLE V
APPORTIONMENT SYSTEMS AND URBAN REPRESENTATION
extent to which the white citizens of a state could afford to overrepresent a negro minority
or the extent to which the citizens of Michigan’s lower peninsula could afford to over-
represent the small (3.9%) but significant geographic minority in its upper peninsula.
16 These include Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Washington, Oregon, New York, and Pennsyl-
vania in Group 1; Texas, Virginia, Colorado, and Minnesota in Group 2; and, Alabama,
Delaware, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Florida in Group 4.
17 See "Constitutional Provisions for State Legislative Apportionment," Western Political Quar-
terly, 8 (June 1955), 271-79. Jewell’s classifications include: Straight Population; Popu-
lation with Weighted Ratio; Combination of Population and Area; Equal Apportionment
for Each Unit ; Fixed Constitutional Apportionment ; and Taxation.
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of the urban-rural census categories might conceal variations in the representation of
the most populous cities and counties. It might be objected that the urban census
category includes inhabitants of very small towns as well as residents of metropolitan
central cities. Apportionment controversies tend to involve alleged underrepresenta-
tion of relatively small areas of a given state, in which a large proportion of the state’s
population resides.
Since we wished to measure the representation of the classic opponents in the
reapportionment struggle, the urban and the rural populations, we have accepted
the census definition of those categories. We find, however, that our rankings would
differ but little if we measured instead the representation of the population of the
&dquo;majority counties&dquo; in each state (i.e., the smallest number of counties including a
majority of the state’s population). A rank ordering of the states on this basis is
presented in tables VI and VII. It will be noted that the coefficient of rank-correla-
tion between tables I and VI is .909, while that between tables II and VII is .819.
This high correlation is not surprising in view of the concentration of urban popula-
tion in the majority counties.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis suggests that while there is a genuine problem of urban underrepre-
sentation, it is on the whole least severe in those highly urbanized states where the
reapportionment battle has been the most bitter, and where the traditional rhetoric
of urban-rural conflict has been most earnestly invoked, in and out of courtrooms.
Many of the most important sources of political conflict in state government are not
directly related to the urban-rural apportionment controversy. We feel that our find-
ings tend to support the conclusions of other scholars. ’18 The intensity of the struggle
over apportionment in states in the acceptable (Group 1) category of our analysis,
e.g., Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin, strongly indicates that there are other
significant factors beyond the scope of urban-rural conflict.
This does not mean that there is no serious problem in the representation of
urban populations and interests. The present controversy demands a complete evalu-
ation of the representative systems of our state governments. In many of our highly
urbanized states, urban-based majorities have found it impossible to redirect public
policy because they have been unable to win control of either or both houses of the
18 See Robert S. Friedman, "Reapportionment Myth," National Civic Review, April 1960,
pp. 184-88; and "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," Western Political Quarterly, 14
(June 1961), 481-95; David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois
and Missouri Legislative Delegations," American Political Science Review, 52 (December
1958), 1051-65; and Robert H. Salisbury, "Missouri Politics and State Political Systems,"
Missouri Political Science Associations Research Papers 1958 (Columbia: Bureau of Gov-
ernmental Research, University of Missouri, 1959), No. 2, p. 16.
For a somewhat contrary view, see Gordon E. Baker, Rural Versus Urban Political
Power (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955). Our findings do not coincide with Baker’s.
He classified the states into five categories (pp. 16-17), on the basis of the representation
of principal urban areas. The basis for the selection of these principal urban areas is
not explicit, but apparently they were selected as examples of severe urban underrepre-
sentation. While such a classification is useful for illustrating extreme degrees of under-
representation, the method "cannot divulge a complete picture in any state" (p. 15), as
Professor Baker notes. Our measurement has a different objective: to consider both over-




states legislature. Feelings of apathy and hopelessness about this situation have given
way to a rather manic euphoria since the Baker and Reynolds decisions. Newspapers
and magazines have aroused the most far-fetched expectations about &dquo;the revolt
against hayseed rule.&dquo; These expectations may be highly unrealistic if it should
develop that even the elimination of all or most rural overrepresentation would still
leave major political cleavages between a normal statewide majority for governor
and other executive ofhces on the one hand and legislative majorities based on geo-
graphic districts on the other.
The embarrassing paucity of political science research on apportionment has
already caused courts to resort to some rather pitiful expedients in analyzing the
apportionments before them. Political scientists clearly have some important tasks
before them. One such task is to determine the extent to which the problem of state
legislative representation is (a) an urban-rural problem, and (b) an apportionment
problem. To date, the courts have not done so. If, as it seems most probable to us,
the real grievances of most of the urban litigants in apportionment cases are far
deeper and more complex than the disproportion in population size of legislative
districts, we will need analyses of other variables involved in state politics. For exam-
ple, the extremely uneven distribution of political party strength in most highly
urbanized states, when combined with a system of single member districts, may turn
out to be a far more important cause of urban frustration than the overrepresenta-
tion of rural areas. At any rate, the data and analyses presented in this article sug-
gest the desirability of such new directions for future research.
